How Political Narratives Are Built Online: Insights from 6-12 April

Most Controversial Posts of the Week

Our controversial-posts ranking identifies social-media publications (on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and other platforms) that combine a negative tone and messaging with wide reach and numerous shares. The most controversial posts for the week of 6-12 April were:

Greater diversity among the authors and topics of the most controversial posts was observed during the past week. The party Velichie tops the author ranking (2 posts), thanks to the television appearances of two parliamentary candidates - Pavel Stoimenov (7 April) and Yordan Mitsikulev (8 April) - in which domestic political topics were discussed.

On 6 April, Siyanie leader Nikolay Popov called for participation in the anti-corruption protest in front of the Pleven Courthouse (scheduled for 8 April), which coincided with the date of the defamation case filed against him. The following day, during a bTV debate on “Regional Development and Infrastructure”, Pavel Stoimenov accused GERB-SDS, in the person of Nikolay Nankov, of corruption in the road sector.

Another highly controversial post from 7 April was linked to the appearance of Progressive Bulgaria leader Rumen Radev on Martin Karbovski's show. It levelled accusations at PP-DB, claiming that through the activation of the rapid alert mechanism, the coalition aimed to discredit and steal the elections, as well as extend the caretaker cabinet's tenure following the “Romanian model”.

The upcoming elections were also the focus of the next two posts. On 9 April, Radev urged Bulgarians to vote “with a clear heart and conscience” for “freedom, solidarity, and justice”. On 10 April, journalist Kevork Kevorkyan criticised President Iliyana Yotova's call not to instil fear in people about the upcoming elections as absurd, citing the activation of the European rapid-response system and the signing of the security agreement with Ukraine as legitimate grounds for concern.

The posts by PP-DB parliamentary candidates Asen Vasilev (11 April) and Anna Bodakova (12 April) were tied to media appearances and highlighted the coalition's priorities - combating corruption and funding the cultural sector. DPS-NN leader Delyan Peevski was the target of attacks by both authors.

Ranking of Politicians by Influence on Social Media

The Influence Score (Impact Score) ranks politicians based on how popular social-media posts from their official profiles are, and how frequently posts from other profiles mention them by name.

Among the leaders of the five main forces, the gradual weekly decline in influence scores observed since the second half of March continues. The most dramatic drop (−1,648 points) is recorded by GERB-SDS leader Boyko Borisov, who cedes his position in the ranking to PP chair Asen Vasilev.

A significant decline is also recorded by Progressive Bulgaria leader Rumen Radev, who posts his weakest week since the start of our monitoring period - exactly three times lower than his record high in the week of 15-22 March. The four smaller party leaders' scores are converging: Krum Zarkov (BSP) falls to his lowest score since March and is narrowly overtaken by Ivelin Mihaylov of Velichie and Nikolay Popov of Siyanie.

The “Romanian Scenario” Stolen-Election Narrative on Telegram

During an interview with Martin Karbovski, Rumen Radev accused the PP-DB coalition of attempting to discredit the upcoming elections following the “Romanian model” - a reference to the Romanian Constitutional Court's decision to invalidate the first-round election results won by the far-right, pro-Russian candidate Calin Georgescu. According to Radev, PP-DB's activation of the European rapid-response system was an attempt to extend the caretaker cabinet's tenure.

Radev's statement spread across 14 Telegram posts in the period 6-11 April, and the reaction to it was not one-sided. In the earliest post (6 April), it was the party Velichie - not Radev - that was presented as the potential victim of a “Romanian scenario”. In 7-8 April posts the content was directly linked to Radev's statement; from 9-11 April the “stolen election” theory circulated without naming specific parties.

Posts came from channels and media of varying orientation. Alongside nationalist or conspiratorial channels (VECHNA BULGARIA; CHISTOKRAVNITE toest NEvaksiniranite - HORATA S CHISTA KRAV) were party channels (There Is Such a People / ITN), supporter channels (Vazrozhdentsi Zad Granitsa) and media outlets (aferaBG). Also present was the Bulgarian wing of the pro-Kremlin network InfoDefense, run by sanctioned pro-Russian blogger Yuriy Podolyaka.

The volume of posts distributed through coordinated sharing is small. Of note is the high activity (3 posts) of one user - a Vazrazhdane supporter - who accused Progressive Bulgaria's leader of plagiarising ideas and positions from Kostadin Kostadinov's party.

New Information Interfaces

Prediction Markets for the Bulgarian Elections

As election day approaches, the eight markets linked to the elections on the prediction platform Polymarket are becoming increasingly active. Their total volume has doubled from $273,000 to $545,000, whilst liquidity, though lower ($462,000), has nonetheless grown by 17%.

The odds indicate that in many respects platform users consider the final election outcome to be a foregone conclusion: the chances of Progressive Bulgaria finishing first are assessed at 98%, the forecast for GERB-SDS in second place stands at 95%, and PP-DB's third place is rated at 78%. Bets that the next Bulgarian Prime Minister will be Rumen Radev are priced at 91% probability.

On the other question - which parties will clear the threshold for entry into the National Assembly - the trends from the previous week hold. BSP's chances are assessed at 66%, reinforcing the forecast of a six-party parliament; the prospects for the remaining contenders are considered minimal.

The Bulgarian Voter and Large Language Models

This week we continue to examine what information the Bulgarian voter would receive when using large language models for consultation on election-related topics. We continue the simulated conversations with the Bulgarian model BgGPT Chat, this time covering the conservative-nationalist and punitive-protest profiles. Each profile put five questions to the chatbot.

The first striking feature of the conversation with the conservative-nationalist voter is that Progressive Bulgaria and Velichie are entirely absent from the model's responses, while in their place appear political actors that are not currently active and will not be standing in the April elections: Obedineni Patrioti, Novoto Vreme, and Balgarski Vazhod.

The simulated dialogue with the punitive-protest profile began hesitantly - the chatbot declined the first two questions. Only when asked to name a party not connected to “backroom politics” did BgGPT Chat begin to respond with the names of real political formations, concluding that whilst no party is entirely “untouched”, the closest to that description is PP-DB.

Across the four conversations, GERB is mentioned 41 times - the leader, thanks to the volume of accumulated media content. DPS follows with 33 mentions; BSP and PP-DB share third place with 24. The smaller parties from the 51st parliament are almost entirely absent (Velichie once; MECh and APS not at all), while several formations outside parliament with marginal or zero electoral prospects (Bulgaria Mozhe, Pryaka Demokratsiya, Balgarski Vazhod, Obedineni Patrioti, Izpravi se.BG, Van ot ES i NATO) do appear.

BgGPT Chat continues to exhibit the expected - though nonetheless concerning - tendency to illustrate its responses with references to non-existent programmes, initiatives, and legislative proposals.