How Political Narratives Are Built Online: Insights from 30 March - 5 April

Most Controversial Posts of the Week

Our controversial-posts ranking identifies social media publications (on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and other platforms) that combine a negative tone and messaging with wide reach and numerous shares. The most controversial posts for the week of 30 March - 5 April were:

The figure who clearly dominated controversy-generating content this week is the leader of Progressive Bulgaria, Rumen Radev. He authored the leading post on three of the seven days, was quoted in a fourth (in the novini.bg post on 5 April), and was the target of attack in a fifth (in Asen Vasilev's post on 4 April).

In his statements, Radev described EU sanctions against Russian oil as a manifestation of a "suicidal" policy (31 March) and accused the political forces of the "coalition" - GERB-SDS and PP-DB - of behind-the-scenes collaboration (3 April). For his part, the leader of Vazrazhdane, Kostadin Kostadinov, claimed on 2 April that the Central Election Commission (CEC) would send voting machines to Turkey to rig the elections there, and insinuated that President Erdogan would help Radev.

Bulgaria-Ukraine Agreements and the Ukrainian-Language Claim

The agreements between Bulgaria and Ukraine signed during the government visit became the occasion for two of the leading controversial posts. Rumen Radev (1 April) criticised the security agreement signed by caretaker PM Andrey Gyurov and accused the cabinet of preparing to grant 17 million to Ukraine "without asking anyone". The official Vazrazhdane profile (31 March) asked users whether they wanted their children "to learn Ukrainian at school" - the largest-audience post of the week.

The claim that Bulgaria was committed to introducing Ukrainian language teaching in schools appeared in 326 posts in the period 30 March - 5 April. On 4 April, caretaker Minister of Education Prof. Sergey Ivanov dismissed the claim as false on the BNT programme Denyat Zapochva s Georgi Lyubenov, after which the topic faded from the information space.

The Vazrazhdane Facebook post from 31 March became the most controversial post of the day with a controversy score of 9.4, accumulating 19,800 interactions and 172 shares. Notable was the high engagement from a copy shared in a group of Rumen Radev supporters (371 interactions).

On the same day, Vazrazhdane MP Tsoncho Ganev published a related post (16,600 interactions) claiming the Bulgarian education system was due to have teaching and historical materials rewritten to add a "Ukrainian educational component". His post was also shared via his Telegram channel and from there into a wider - predominantly pro-Russian - network.

Among the authors, two channels stand out as parts of larger pro-Russian content-distribution networks. One belongs to the Pravda network, which aggregates automated content from Russian sources and republishes it in multiple languages. The other is part of the international Druschba/Druzhba FM group of channels, believed to be run by influencer Sergey Filbert and blogger Alina Lipp. Their channel shared the post to the channel of Vazrazhdane na Otechestvoto (Revival of the Fatherland), the party of Magnitsky-sanctioned Nikolay Malinov.

Heightened sharing activity was observed at two distinct times: at 12:29, the post spread to five channels - the three pro-Russian channels above plus two anti-NATO channels - and at 17:40, the leading author by post count (3) shared it across three channels of broadly conspiratorial orientation.

Ranking of Politicians by Influence on Social Media

The Influence Score (Impact Score) ranks politicians based on how popular social-media posts from their official profiles are, and how frequently posts from other profiles mention them by name.

We continue to track how this metric evolves for the leaders of the five parties and coalitions sociologists consider certain to secure seats in the next parliament, as well as for the leaders of four other forces competing for entry.

Data for the week of 30 March to 5 April show a decline or plateau for nearly all the political leaders monitored. For many, this represents a return to the levels observed at the start of March; the peaks recorded around the start of the campaign on 20 March proved to be short-lived.

This week's top 15 sees several shifts. Leaders of smaller political forces such as Siyanie (Nikolay Popov) and Bulgaria Mozhe (Kuzman Iliev) have dropped out, replaced by figures from the GERB-SDS and PP-DB coalitions.

The visit of National Assembly Speaker Raya Nazaryan to Ukraine for the second parliamentary summit in Bucha lifted her to fifth place, ahead of party leaders such as Delyan Peevski (DPS) and Kostadin Kostadinov (Vazrazhdane).

Entering the ranking for the first time is Gabriel Valkov from the BSP-OL coalition, who during the week gave an interview for Martin Karbovski's YouTube channel arguing the need for a strong left-wing party and criticising the signed agreement between Bulgaria and Ukraine.

Another new name is Anna Bodakova, one of the young faces of the December 2025 protests and a PP-DB parliamentary candidate. She is the only politician in the top 15 whose name appears more frequently in posts with a positive tone than in those with a negative one.

Reaction to the EU Rapid Alert Mechanism

The activation of the European rapid alert mechanism in the context of the upcoming Bulgarian elections - and interpretations of its functions - gave rise to a fresh wave of narratives in both the Bulgarian and Russian-language information spaces.

Between 4 and 5 April, two groups of channels on Bulgarian Telegram distributed a post from the channel of the media outlet efir info, which republished a Facebook post by writer Veselin Stamenov describing the mechanism as an instrument for imposing censorship on the Bulgarian people by Brussels. On 4 April, the efir info post from 11:28 was shared simultaneously at 13:22 across six channels - identical to those that had participated in distributing the Vazrazhdane post.

The topic was also covered by media in the Russian Federation. Moskovsky Komsomolets ran an article claiming the Bulgarian government had contacted the office of Kaja Kallas requesting that major social networks be silenced and that foreign interference - primarily from Russia or China - be identified and halted. It included an interview with Oleg Bondarenko, a self-described Balkans expert who argued the action was driven by fear of a victory by President (2017-2026) Rumen Radev.

Another article making insinuations about European interference circulated in Moldovan publications and Telegram channels, quoting sociologist Zhivko Georgiev's claim that Bulgaria's EU membership had not resolved poverty and that the adoption of the euro had led to price rises in some cases more than double those in Germany. The article was further amplified by a Facebook post from former Moldovan Deputy PM Alexander Muravsky (251 interactions).

New Information Interfaces

Prediction Markets for the Bulgarian Elections

We continue to monitor new information verticals that are gradually gaining traction in Bulgaria as alternative methods for measuring public sentiment. As of the morning of 6 April, the number of open markets linked to the upcoming parliamentary elections remains eight, but the total volume of predictions has risen by nearly 38% to $273,000, while liquidity has increased by 11.5% to $396,000.

The largest market remains the overall winner forecast. The probability of a Progressive Bulgaria victory is assessed at 93%, against 6% for GERB-SDS and less than 1% for all remaining political forces.

No significant changes are observed in the margin-of-victory market either. The probability of Rumen Radev's coalition winning with a lead of 5 to 10 percentage points over the second-placed party is assessed at 44%, broadly in line with the most recent opinion polls.

The Bulgarian Voter and Large Language Models

This week we tested what information Bulgarian voters would receive if they consulted a large language model when deciding how to vote. We chose BgGPT Chat, developed by the institute INSAIT, whose third version was presented in late March. Using the free version, we simulated several parallel conversations to ensure responses were not influenced by other interactions.

We developed four socio-psychological profiles of hypothetical Bulgarian voters - left-nostalgic, liberal-cosmopolitan, conservative-nationalist, and punitive-protest. For each, we wrote five questions (four positively framed, one negative). This report covers findings from the first two profiles.

In each conversation, BgGPT Chat declined to give direct voting guidance but offered lists of parties for which it held information relevant to the question, with regular warnings urging users to verify facts. However, the presence or absence of certain information indicates a voter would receive incomplete or potentially misleading answers.

Some programmes cited by BgGPT Chat do not exist - for example the so-called Redovi Domove programme attributed to DPS or Zhivot Bez Syanka attributed to ITN. Data on expected average annual economic growth under different parties was also questionable.

On the negatively framed question, BgGPT Chat said it could not predict what parties "will" do in the future and instead cited those most often accused of corruption: GERB, DPS, ITN and BSP - the only mention of the socialist party across the entire dialogue.

The chatbot added that "on the basis of public sources and analyses as of April 2024", the parties GERB and DPS could undermine democratic processes through corruption, abuse of power, and restrictions on media freedom.